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Abstract 
The move to joint capabilities has proven to be an important paradigm shift in 
defense.  The reasons for the shift are grounded in the need to allow the agility that 
shared resources provide.  This research sought to identify whether the need for 
joint capabilities influenced acquisition success.   This study examined five years 
worth of data and looked at a number of interdependencies for their influence on 
acquisition success.  Two specific objectives were pursued: (1) to test the influence 
of funding and data interdependencies on acquisition performance, and (2) to test 
the interdependent programs for the presence of cascading effects. The results 
proved particularly pivotal.  With additional research, the study of interdependencies 
may offer promise for improving early assessment of program development 
resources, establishing more realistic program thresholds, and highlighting areas of 
risk that may have escaped management attention. 
Keywords: Interdependency, Complexity, Acquisition Performance, Joint 
Capabilities 
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Acquisition Risks in a World of Joint Capabilities 
Under the auspices of Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, Department of 
Defense (DoD) transformation became a compelling objective in the aftermath of 
September 11, 2001 (Rumsfeld, 2003).  During the Cold War era military strategy was 
predicated on the belief that deterrence was best achieved through arms superiority.  
Quantitative and qualitative superiority was achieved by heavy reliance on scientific 
management principles as an organizing paradigm (Hughes, 1998).  Economies of 
scale were achieved in arms production through a capital-intensive industrial base that 
stressed the principles of scientific management: hierarchy, division of work, functional 
specialization, and the separation of planning from operations.  These strategies gave 
rise to a plethora of individual subcultures with distinct missions, goals, and 
vocabularies. 
The demise of the Soviet Union, and the resulting proliferation of multiple non-
state-affiliated threats, coupled with emergent, limited interventions around the globe, 
called into question the arms superiority philosophy as a deterrent.  In this multilateral, 
asymmetric threat world, the deterrent value of massive armed forces eroded and the 
normative framework that defined the Cold War, and the DoD, imploded.  Instead, the 
operational advantage shifted from a focus on mass and firepower to one of agility and 
precision (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2000).  Quite suddenly, agile, tightly 
integrated Joint Status operations, in which functional specialists are brought together to 
provide a specific capability suited to a particular operational context was needed.  
The need to adopt a “Joint Status” perspective was first echoed in 1996 in a 
publication by the Office of the Joint Status Chiefs of Staff entitled Joint Status Vision 
2010.  Termed “Joint Status Capabilities,” the concept was later formalized in the 2001 
Quadrennial Defense Review. Because it was believed that the future operating 
environment would be characterized by uncertainty, complexity, rapid change, and 
persistent conflict, DoD leadership initiated the capability to act jointly. The fact that 
irregular warfare threats exceed the capabilities of any single agency of government is 
no longer disputed.  It has become clear that future forces will find themselves operating 
as one military element in an integrated national task force or, at a minimum, in close 
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conjunction with other agencies of government. 
The transformation to joint capabilities attempts to provide military forces with the 
capability to adapt quickly to new challenges and unexpected circumstances by 
leveraging a wider range of assets. Central to the transformation was the desire for 
enhanced coordination among agencies and across all levels of government (coalition, 
federal, state, and local). In addressing the need for interagency cooperation, then Vice 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Giambastiani (2003) claimed that the 
integrated force had to become interdependent. That is, it must be capabilities-based, 
collaborative, and network centric. Giambastiani argued that military efforts required 
high-level, or large-scale, vertical and horizontal collaboration—up and down the chain 
of command and across all capabilities and forces. 
At its core, the transformation is about instilling processes and practices that 
promote knowledge and agility.  In short, joint capabilities is viewed as a mechanism to 
expand both the breadth and depth of current understandings, and to facilitate the agility 
needed to spontaneously leverage a wide range of inter-service, inter-governmental, 
and inter-national resources.  According to Admiral Mullen to be successful the DoD 
needs new joint doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures (Garamone, 2009). 
Apparently, new methods for integrating activities both internally and with partners are 
needed. Jointness requires that the DoD select, educate, train, equip, and manage 
differently. Moreover, new technologies are needed to adapt to existing technologies to 
achieve new joint missions. 
Despite the recognized need for jointness, the literature on its influence on 
acquisition is largely lacking.  Research is especially crucial because jointness cannot 
be successful without the implementation of requisite material solutions. Successful joint 
initiatives require more than human collaboration. They require material solutions that 
operate together in a systematic fashion. The ability to develop material solutions that 
can undergird joint demands is ultimately an issue of acquisition because joint 
acquisition efforts are typically needed to recognize joint military operations. A recent 
Government Accountability Office (2011) report argued that sharing domain information, 
policy and processes, technology, legal restrictions, and cultural barriers all impede the 
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ability to benefit from joint capabilities.  These same factors are also likely to stymie 
acquisition.  Thus, the study of the risks associated with joint acquisition is an important, 
albeit understudied, topic.  This research seeks to address this gap and looks at 
jointness in the acquisition arena from a number of different dimensions. 
The report begins with a short introduction of the salient components of the 
networks that form interdependent activities.  Some of the risks are also discussed.  The 
research questions are then provided.  The research methods follow.  The report closes 
with a discussion of the findings and the implications for DoD acquisition. 
The Organizational Networks of Interdependent Activities 
The study of jointness is fundamentally a study of interdependence.  Joint actions 
rely on an exchange of resources.  Exchange theorists argue that organizations develop 
interdependent relationships with other organizational entities to either obtain critical 
resources or to provide critical capabilities. Typical resources that are often exchanged 
include labor, materials, data, and financial capital. Interdependencies occur when a 
given organization relies on the exchange to maintain fitness.  The exchanges give rise 
to a network of actors that exchange resources to achieve goals that otherwise could 
not be obtained.  In this way, the study of organizational interdependencies is 
simultaneously a study of organizational networks. 
As discussed further in this report, program networks serve as the basis from 
which the interdependence is defined and the wider array of resources become 
available.  Hence, they are a critical underpinning to the realization of joint capabilities.  
Program networks exhibit five salient components.  The examination of each of the 
components provides important insight into the nature of the network.  As elaborated 
on, it can provide important information on issues pertaining to performance, risk, cost, 
and schedule.  Program networks can be defined according to their nodes, assets, 
configurations, channels, and zones. 
Program Network Nodes 
In general, in any network a node is a connection point that acts as a 
redistribution point, or an end point, for a transmission of some sort of asset.  In 
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program networks nodes include systems, organizations, individuals, and computers.  In 
fact, unlike computer networks, which define only processing units as nodes, a program 
network will often include a mixture of systems, organizations, and computers.  
However, the primary node tends to be the organization with its associated systems and 
computers.  The organizations that act as nodes in the network often differ in a variety 
of ways.  They can be government entities or private sector entities.  They can be 
similar in discipline and function or they can vary widely.  Regardless, they all tend to 
share one important trait—they tend to exhibit a high degree of autonomy over the 
scope and nature of their involvement in the network.  The autonomy derives from the 
fact that each member comes from a different organization and it is relatively impossible 
to superimpose a hierarchical command structure.  By definition, program networks 
differ from hierarchical forms of organization by the sheer fact that it is virtually 
impossible to establish a single centralized authority structure that is capable of 
enforcing unilateral compliance.  The boundaries of most networks are defined 
according to the type of interdependencies that exist among the nodes.  Many network 
initiatives seek to minimize the number of nodes to reduce complexity.  Hence, most 
nodes will bring critical assets to the network that cannot be easily obtained elsewhere. 
In the economics arena, there is an assumption that organizations will only 
engage in a network to the extent to which benefits are realized.  Once the cost 
outweighs the benefits, the resources will be obtained in a different manner.  Hence, 
networks provide a net benefit.  In the government sector, this assumption rarely rings 
true.  Policy legislation often mandates that networks achieve given goals and, as 
discussed further below, these mandated relationships can accrue transaction costs.  
As a result, networks are likely to influence both the cost and risk of acquisition. 
Program Network Assets 
Program networks exist for the sole purpose of sharing, exchanging, or 
transferring resources or assets.  In most program networks, the assets are in the form 
of capital, data (to include information, knowledge, or expertise), materiel, or labor.  In 
many of the DoD initiatives, program networks are established to facilitate the transfer 
of data.  However, others exist to share capital.  For example, JSTARS was a joint Air 
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Force-Army initiative that was predicated on sharing financial capital.  The U.S. 
Congress refused to authorize the initiative unless both Services pooled their financial 
resources and developed the capability jointly.  Still others will share or trade critical 
materiels, labor, or expertise.  Under some situations, a given program network will 
actually involve the trading, sharing, and transferring of all of these assets (capital, data, 
materiel, and labor).  An important dimension of the program network, as will be 
discussed further later in this report, is the issue of “balance” or symmetry.   When each 
of the nodes benefits equally from involvement, the network is seen as balanced.  
However, when some nodes or organizations benefit to the detriment of others, the 
network is unbalanced and is at risk for problems (this topic is discussed further in the 
“risk” section). 
Program Network Configurations 
Thompson’s (1967) work on organizations in action defined three types of 
network configurations: pooled, sequential, and reciprocal.  Since the time of his 
research, the nature of the configurations has grown increasingly more complex—in 
short, as discussed further later in this report, they have grown beyond the simple 
tripartite definition.  But as a starting point, his definition provides the basic structural 
elements that underpin program networks.  The structural configuration defines how the 
assets flow among the nodes.  It is, in short, the architecture of the transactions that 
occur in the network. 
According to Thompson (1967), in pooled configurations the various parties 
contribute to, and draw on, resources from a shared pool. A typical example might be to 
share a common core of hardware and software.  In fact, the DoD’s move to service-
oriented architectures or cloud computing can be thought of as a pooled configuration.  
The various branches will post data and services on the network, and subscribers will 
have the luxury to draw down from the pool of resources.  Another example might be 
the economies of scale that two or more nodes achieve by procuring from the same 
source.  In this case, the withdrawal of one of the nodes may end up increasing the 
costs for the remaining nodes.  The important characteristic of pooled configurations is 
that each of the contributors and beneficiaries act independently.  They may rely on the 
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pool for needed resources, but their actions are not intricately linked.  This type of 
interdependency is only indirect in nature because each node can provide its 
contribution to the system independently, but for the success of the system, both will 
have to succeed in their contributions. For this reason pooled configurations are seen 
as “loosely coupled.” 
Gaining in complexity, the second configuration is termed “sequential” 
(Thompson, 1967).  In sequential configurations, the exchange of resources flow in one 
direction only, from one party to the next, and then the next.  Typical examples are 
supply chain systems.  Figure 1 provides an illustration of a sequential configuration.   It 
is important to recognize that with sequential configurations, the output of one party 
becomes the input of another.  Because one party is dependent on another for its 
output, the structure is more “tightly linked” than in the pooled configuration. 
 
Figure 1. Program Network Configurations 
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Another defining characteristic of sequential configurations is that they can be 
decomposed into dyads, or pairs of nodes.  The general thinking is that each party will 
work to ensure that their source of input is stable, reliable, and meets quality thresholds.  
Hence, bilateral agreements are not uncommon in this situation.  So, the sequential 
configuration tends to be made up of a number of bilateral pair-wise agreements.  In this 
way, the chain is maintained. To date, a significant amount of study has focused on 
pair-wise sequential approaches to product and service acquisition and delivery.  
Because they are easily decomposable, much has been learned about behaviors, costs, 
and risks. 
The third configuration form is termed “reciprocal” (Thompson, 1967).  In 
reciprocal arrangements resources are frequently traded, recompiled, and re-traded 
(see Figure 1). These configurations tend to include multiple recursive feedback loops 
among the parties involved. Of the three configurations, reciprocal configurations are 
the most difficult to design, implement, and maintain yet they also tend to yield the 
greatest benefits.  They also tend to be the source of the greatest agility, primarily 
because they adapt well to new encounters and can adapt to meet immediate needs.  
These relationships are also known to demonstrate synergistic gains.  Nonetheless, 
they tend to be high risk (more on this topic later in this report). 
Whereas the three configurations provide a starting point for understanding 
interdependent activities, the reality of today’s activities are far more complex. In short, 
it is not unusual for the acquisition or production of a service to incorporate multiple 
configurations with resources flowing in and out across organizations of public and 
private entities. As such, the most common configuration is the “mixed” pattern 
incorporating all three of the configurations and a wide array of nodes, assets, channels, 
and zones. Hence, the value chain of the joint capability is laden with junctions and 
bifurcations where delay, defection, or shirking can occur.  Furthermore, as is evident in 
Figure 1, the value chain is laden with both direct and indirect interdependencies. 
Program Network Channels 
Channels are the links or ties that span the nodes.  They are the mechanisms 
that act to transport an asset from one node to another.  Hence they are critical to the 
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functioning of the network. Typical mechanisms for the transfer of assets include postal 
services, telephones, and face-to-face channels.  Face-to-face approaches are often 
needed to both initiate and sustain efforts.  More recently, products and services are 
either routed or transferred via computer networks, satellites, and sensors.  Regardless 
of the channel, issues of bandwidth, congestion, and noise all remain salient. As 
expected, it is not uncommon to employ multiple channels and redundancy is often 
used when the resource is particularly critical. The choice of a given channel, and its 
specifications, typically needs to be coordinated between the sender and the receiver to 
ensure that the resource is received accurately, in a timely manner, and at the proper 
specification level. 
Channels can be formal or informal, permanent or ad hoc.  They can be 
governed by simple handshakes or they can involve detailed contracts and agreements.  
Moreover, depending on the assets and the terms of the transfer, the channel can be 
asynchronous or synchronous.  Channels are often defined in light of the direction of the 
flow of the resource, and the reliability, integrity, and performance of the channel is 
often contingent on the value of the asset being transported. 
Program Network Zones 
As illustrated in the mixed model in Figure 1, the notion of zones refers to the 
boundaries of a given network.  In general, a zone is an area of administration.  The 
program network zone is the area inside the boundaries that must be administered and 
monitored for proper functioning.   
The zone makes up the entire landscape of the program network and includes all 
of the relevant nodes, assets, configurations, and channels that must be administered.  
In reality, program networks will exhibit multiple zones simultaneously. For example, 
one zone of nodes and channels may relate to financial assets, but a second zone 
drawn around data assets may show a different set of nodes and channels (see Figure 
2).   As such, it is often a relative term.  Program network zones are contiguous to the 
point of final termination.  Hence, the boundaries can be difficult to isolate.  It is not 
uncommon for the zones to change over time. 
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Figure 2. Network Layers With Interlocks 
In most cases the boundaries will be drawn, and the zone thus identified, based 
on the assets that are transferred or exchanged to provide a given capability.  But zones 
can also be isolated from the context of a single node.  In this way the flows in and out 
of a node can be examined in much the same way as supply chains or pooled 
configurations.  The notion of zones becomes especially important in light of the 
network’s stability and the need to maintain equilibrium.  In a joint capability arena, 
warfighters should be able to move across program zones with ease, tapping the 
resources that are needed anywhere anytime. To the warfighter, the various program 
zones should be invisible and seamless.  Table 1 provides an overview of the three 
configuration types along a number of dimensions.
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Situational 
Awareness 
As discussed previously, program networks can be examined in light of their 
nodes, assets, configurations, channels, and zones.  Each of these dimensions provide 
critical insight into the fitness of the network and its potential for success.  An important 
determinant of a network’s cost, schedule, and performance is grounded in the ability to 
adapt to changes relatively easily without encountering too much turbulence. 
Despite the difficulty that reciprocal configurations pose, they hold tremendous 
potential for returns on investment and benefit gain.  The gains that tend to arise from 
reciprocal configurations are often synergistic in nature rather than additive.  Because 
they are data rich, they allow data to be extracted, fused, and recompiled to provide 
additional value that is not normally achievable at an individual level.  Reciprocal 
configurations tend to have high analytical demands on the design process because the 
collective space from which synergistic benefits derive must be constructed.  Unlike the 
other two configuration types, there is no existing knowledge base from which to base a 
design.  Instead, the solution space must be crafted. The design process is time and 
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attention intensive because solutions must be crafted to meet a vast array of divergent 
needs.  As a consequence, the transaction costs can be very high—and they are often 
hidden and under predicted. 
According to researchers, network success is contingent on intentionally 
adapting, coordinating, and safeguarding the exchanges that occur within the network 
(Jones, Hesterly, & Borgatti, 1997). But, how one successfully coordinates and 
safeguards the exchanges remains the subject of tremendous debate.  Provan and 
Milward (2001) argued that, due to the open and permeable boundaries and the lack of 
centralized command structures, management challenges are immense. They claimed 
that managers must continuously deal with problems requiring negotiating, coordinating, 
monitoring, holding third parties accountable, and writing and enforcing contracts all in 
an inter-organizational setting in which information asymmetries and moral hazards 
abound. 
According to Agranoff and McGuire (2001), networks demand transparency and 
detailed knowledge of their member affiliates. Isett and Provan (2005) argued that 
success is dependent on the development of formal agreements to limit opportunistic 
behavior.  This may be especially true because program managers tend to be very 
skilled at hedging.  Concerned about risk, program managers often keep options open 
so that they can pursue one strategy over another in the event of unacceptable risk.  
Hence, defection can be a problem. Yet, Radin and Romzek (1996) disagreed and 
suggested that networks are likely to be more effective under low-control accountability 
relationships rather than under high-control relationships that employ legal or 
hierarchical authority. 
Conversely, Mandell (2001) argued that there is no evidence that any "best 
practice" or favored institutional form has had any positive effect on network outcomes. 
Despite the lack of congruence in the findings thus far, few would dispute the notion that 
open and permeable boundaries typify network structures.  It is precisely these "open 
boundaries" that render it difficult to coordinate and safeguard exchanges because of 
the uncertainty and unpredictability that accompanies environmental flux. In exchange 
theory, the uncertainty is often attributed to the interdependencies that exist among the 
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organizations.  The source of this uncertainty can come from suppliers, customers, 
competitors, regulatory agencies, unions, or financial markets (Miles & Snow, 1978).  
Shirking or defection of a network member can have dire consequences on the survival 
and performance of the network in total and the network participants in general.  
Because of the nature and influence of the ties that bind organizations, Levinthal’s 
(1997) research indicates that increasing the density of the interdependencies that 
connect the organizations affects the complexity of the “landscape” in which the 
organization operates. Levinthal (1997) found that these interconnections, or flows, yield 
nonlinear consequences that often involve multiplier effects based on the nature of the 
interdependencies in the system. 
While DoD agencies are expected to embrace joint capabilities, literature findings 
regarding the risks and best practice mechanisms of joint interdependent activities lag 
far behind. Whereas early research did provide some insights, the research activities 
have stalled and progress is lacking. For example, back in 1937 Coase found that 
interdependencies are based on mutual exchanges that can be examined at the 
transaction level. He argued that these transactions accrued costs that could be 
attributed to establishing the rules of engagement, enforcing agreements, and 
monitoring compliance. Unfortunately, specific cost functions were never isolated. 
Despite the scholarly activities, 10 years ago Agranoff and McGuire (2001) wrote 
that “there are many more questions than answers in network management,” and the 
assertion continues to ring true.  Apparently, the field is rich in anecdotal findings but 
poor in empirical evidence (Alexander, 1995). Oliver and Ebers (1998) likened the state 
of the field to a messy situation marked by a cacophony of heterogeneous concepts, 
theories, and research results. Whereas the growth of networks and interdependencies 
is clearly on the rise, DoD acquisition is moving forward with little insights into the risks 
and threats of joint efforts. Without a deep understanding of the risks and threats that 
interdependent efforts encounter, governance mechanisms that can help to insure 
acquisition success are beyond reach. Given the pace at which joint efforts are pursued, 
early indicators of acquisition risk are needed to help isolate the critical governance 
mechanisms that will mitigate performance shortfalls. 
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This research examines the ties that bind acquisition initiatives in light of two 
different types of transactions: data ties and funding ties. And it begs the question: what 
influence do data and funding interdependencies exhibit on acquisition success?  
Additionally, the research begs the question: do these interdependencies create 
cascading effects on neighbor programs? 
Research Methods 
The study relied on data derived from the Defense Acquisition Management 
Information Retrieval (DAMIR) system.  The results are based on a longitudinal analysis 
of all active Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAPs) over the 2004–2009 time 
period.  CY 2004 was chosen as the beginning point because, as illustrated below, prior 
to 2004 few networks were in place. 
To test the influence of interdependencies on acquisition success, several 
interdependency measures were collected and or constructed.  The first major 
interdependency metric related to program funding.  Two measures were developed.  
The first measure considered the sheer number of program elements (PEs) that funded 
the MDAP research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) efforts.  Procurement 
program elements were not considered because the belief was that the RDT&E 
interdependencies were the most critical to program performance.  Because program 
elements fund multiple MDAPs, “funding nearest neighbors” could be isolated. Thus, 
two proxy measures for funding were obtained: 
1. the sheer number of program elements that fund a given MDAP, and 
2. the number of neighboring MDAPs. 
A second set of measures involves data interdependencies among MDAPs.  The 
data sharing linkages among the MDAPs were obtained from Defense Acquisition 
Executive Summary (DAES) reports.  Thus, the data interdependency measure is the 
number of data linkages of a given MDAP.  It should be noted that the data 
interdependencies were collected by the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) over 
a relatively short time frame (FY 2006–2007).  As a result, changes in the data 
interdependencies could not be isolated.  Moreover, because of the desire to test 
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cascades, the data set was purged for any connections with ACAT 2 programs. 
A dummy variable was also constructed on whether the MDAP had an official 
joint status (0 = nonjoint, 1 = joint).  For those that were officially joint, the number of 
signatories on the requirements document was also collected.  To rule out 
countervailing influences, several control variables were also employed: development 
cost estimate, program manager turnover rates, and a dummy variable for time. 
Because the research was interested in acquisition success, six dependent 
variables were isolated annually:  
1. Total Percent Acquisition Unit Cost growth from the original baseline, 
2. Annual Percent RDT&E PAUC growth (note that since programs started 
earlier than 2004, the annual and total growth variables are not 
synonymous), 
3. the number of APB performance breaches, 
4. percent of schedule cost variance, 
5. percent of estimation cost variance, and 
6. percent of engineering cost variance. 
Table 2 identifies the variables employed in the research along with the mean, 
range, and standard deviation, and Table 3 provides an overview of all the variables in 
the dataset.  In terms of the objectives of the research, the first step was to identify and 
characterize the nature of MDAP interdependencies and to examine how the 
interdependencies changed over time.  Figure 3 provides network renditions of the 
funding interdependencies among the MDAPs over the 2004–2009 time frame.  As 
demonstrated in the network depictions, the complexity of the funding 
interdependencies has grown significantly over the past five years.  The number of links 
grew from 39 to 291 and the density (proportion of all possible links to actual number of 
links) grew from 4% to 23%. The percent of MDAPs that share a funding source grew 
from 30% to 70% over the four-year period (see Figure 4).  The growth in the number of 
MDAPs sharing a program element may prove illustrative of added complexity and 
added risk.  Hence, the number of programs that a given MDAP share a program 
element with is included in the models below. 
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Annual RDT&E PAUC Growth 6,278.03 98.86 505.55
Percent Cost Growth From Baseline 380.95 30.22 59.76
Percent Schedule Cost Variance 42.92 0.54 3.32
Percent Engineering Cost Variance 1,433.47 4.66 71.35
Percent Estimating Cost Variance 324.72 3.02 17.77
Number of APB Performance Breaches 2.00 0.08 0.27
Independent Variables 
Number of RDT&E Program Elements Funding 
MDAP 
47.00 3.50 4.04
Number of Data Links 13.00 1.48 2.12
Number of Signatories on Requirements Document 8.00 1.24 1.10
Both Data and Funding Interdependencies 
Number of Neighboring Funding Links 22.00 1.53 2.60
Official Joint Status 25% 
Control Variables 
Development Estimate 32,300.00 2,190.31 5,009.12
Program Manager Turnover (per year) 18% 
Stage - Procurement 49% 
Table 3. Variables Collected 
Program Number 
Total number of Data links 
Lead service 
Year of Data 
Annual PAUC percent growth -- difference from previous year 
PAUC percent growth from baseline 
Development estimate at Base Year 
Stage (0=development 1 = production) 
Program's base year 
Percent of RDTE funding coming from non-lead component 
Whether PM turned over during a given year taken from Change in PM's name in 
SAR 0=no 1=yes 
Number of program elements funding a given PNO 
Number of PE nearest neighbors derived from network renderings 
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Number of nearest data neighbors derived from network renderings of Finley 
diagrams 
Economic Cost Variance 
Percent economic variance 
Schedule Cost Variance 
Percent schedule variance 
Engineering Cost Variance 
Percent engineering variance 
Estimating Cost Variance 
Percent estimating variance 
Other Cost Variance 
Percent other variance 
Percent quantity variance 
Support Cost Variance 
Percent support variance 
Total percent variance 
Number of schedule breaches by a PNO  
Number of performance breaches by a PNO 
Number of RDTE breaches by a PNO 
Number of procurement breaches by a PNO 
Number of PAUC breaches by a PNO 
Number of APUC breaches by a PNO 
Total number of breaches by a PNO 
Number of current Nunn McCurdy PAUC breaches 
Number of current Nunn McCurdy APUC breaches 
Number of services involved taken from SAR  
Whether a PNO has been designated as joint 
Lead component (Service) 
Air Force signatures Authority 
Navy signatures Authority 
Army signatures Authority 
Number of International Signatures for Change Orders taken from Contracts 
Majority funder's percent contribution 
Service that provides the majority funding 
Number of Signatures on Change Orders taken from MOUs 
Army provides labor 
Air Force provides labor 
Navy provides labor 
Whether the program is collocated 
Total number of signatures on MOA 
Whether the program has a joint program office 0= no 1=yes 
Number of foreign military sales 
Program's age - years from MSB 
Popular Name 
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Figure 3. Funding Interdependencies Over Time 
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Figure 4. Percent of MDAPs That Share a Program Element 
As mentioned, given the data collection procedures, the data interdependencies 
were static and changes over time could not be isolated. 
In total, 97 MDAPs were examined and yielded a total of 353 data links (recall 
that ACAT 2 programs were not included in the analysis) and a density of 18% (see 
Figure 5).  Given the growth in the funding interdependencies, the percent of programs 
that share both data and funding sources grew from 10% to 30% over the study time 
period (see Figure 6).  The sharing of both data and funding interdependencies may 
prove to be an important indicator of risk. 
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Figure 5. MDAP Data Interdependencies 
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Figures 7 and 8 illustrate the scale free nature of both the funding and data 
networks.  Note that the frequency distribution of each of the two networks indicates a 
power law distribution.  The scale free characteristic is important because it may signal 
that a relatively small number of MDAPs exhibit major influences.  The scale free nature 
is noted but is beyond the scope of this research; it  is recommended in the Conclusion 
section of this research that further follow-up be done on this topic. 
 
Figure 7. Scale Free Nature of Funding Network 
 
Figure 8. Scale Free Nature of Data Network 
The next step was to test to see if performance breaches (specifically, the sum 
total of the feature changes, cost overrun, and budget shortfall breaches) correlate with 
any of the interdependency characteristics. Multiple regression was used as the 
analytical technique. Tables 4 through 9 show the results of the regression models that 
tested the influence of the interdependencies on the six acquisition success variables. 
For the most part, the interdependency variables did not offer much in explaining MDAP 
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performance.  However, a few relationships are important to point out. 
Table 4. Dependent Variable: Percent Growth from Baseline 








(Constant) 150.83 106.04 1.42 .16 
Development 
Estimate 
.00 .01 -.05 -.59 .56 
RDT&E Stage -65.90 78.82 -.06 -.84 .40 
PM Turnover 197.36 190.16 .09 1.04 .30 
Dummy 2005 148.12 96.69 .12 1.53 .13 
Dummy 2006 216.42 95.29 .19 2.27 .02 
Number of 
Program Elements 
-24.34 18.58 -.13 -1.31 .19 
Total Number of 
Signatures 
-33.20 41.21 -.07 -.81 .42 
Number of Data 
Links 
6.82 17.08 .03 .40 .69 
Joint Status 351.96 123.45 .27 2.85 .00 
Both Data and 
Funding Links 




-194.06 96.60 -.18 -2.01 .05 
Per Table 4, joint status had a positive influence on percent growth from 
baseline, indicating that, controlling for the other variables, joint programs appear to 
experience greater cost growth.  However, the number of neighboring funding links was 
negatively related to percent growth from baseline.
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Table 5. Dependent Variable: Percent Annual RDT&E PAUC Growth 








(Constant) 48.33 11.46 4.22 .00 
Development 
Estimate 
.00 .00 .19 2.87 .00 
RDT&E Stage -10.18 7.74 -.08 -1.31 .19 
PM Turnover 8.41 17.71 .03 .47 .64 
Dummy 2005 4.62 11.22 .03 .41 .68 
Dummy 2006 .60 12.03 .00 .05 .96 
Dummy 2007 3.13 11.02 .02 .28 .78 
Number of 
Program Elements 
.79 1.94 .03 .41 .68 
Total Number of 
Signatures 
-6.04 3.64 -.12 -1.66 .10 
Number of Data 
Links 
-1.56 1.69 -.06 -.92 .36 
Joint Status -7.10 11.67 -.05 -.61 .54 
Both Data and 
Funding Links 




7.43 9.56 .06 .78 .44 
In Table 5, those programs that shared both data and funding links demonstrated 
a negative influence over annual PAUC RDT&E cost growth. The other 
interdependency variables showed no direct bearing. 
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(Constant) .07 .06 1.27 .20 
Development 
Estimate 
.00 .00 -.09 -1.21 .23 
RDT&E Stage .03 .04 .06 .85 .40 
PM Turnover .01 .09 .01 .08 .93 
Dummy 2005 -.05 .06 -.07 -.89 .38 
Dummy 2006 -.06 .06 -.09 -1.04 .30 
Dummy 2007 -.06 .06 -.10 -1.12 .26 
Number of 
Program Elements 
.01 .01 .08 .86 .39 
Total Number of 
Signatures 
.01 .02 .03 .41 .68 
Number of Data 
Links 
.02 .01 .16 2.40 .02 
Joint Status -.01 .06 -.01 -.09 .93 
Both Data and 
Funding Links 




-.03 .05 -.05 -.59 .56 
The number of data links showed a positive influence over APB performance 
breaches albeit the slope was marginal (see Table 6). 
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Table 7. Dependent Variable: Schedule Cost Variance 








(Constant) .85 .58 1.47 .14 
Development 
Estimate 
.00 .00 .03 .49 .62 
RDT&E Stage .92 .39 .15 2.35 .02 
PM Turnover 2.23 .89 .18 2.50 .01 
Dummy 2005 -1.05 .57 -.14 -1.85 .07 
Dummy 2006 -.83 .61 -.12 -1.37 .17 




-.12 .10 -.11 -1.24 .22 
Total Number of 
Signatures 
-.40 .18 -.16 -2.19 .03 
Number of Data 
Links 
.20 .09 .15 2.37 .02 
Joint Status .74 .59 .10 1.26 .21 
Both Data and 
Funding Links 




.06 .48 .01 .12 .90 
In terms of schedule cost variance the number of signatories yielded a negative 
relationship whereas the number of data links illustrated a positive relationship (see 
Table 7). 
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Table 8. Dependent Variable: Estimation Cost Variance 








(Constant) 8.60 3.59 2.39 .02 
Development 
Estimate 
.00 .00 -.03 -.42 .68 
RDT&E Stage -1.52 2.43 -.04 -.63 .53 
PM Turnover 6.15 5.55 .08 1.11 .27 
Dummy 2005 -5.50 3.52 -.13 -1.56 .12 
Dummy 2006 -5.73 3.77 -.14 -1.52 .13 
Dummy 2007 -8.42 3.45 -.21 -2.44 .02 
Number of 
Program Elements 
.07 .61 .01 .12 .91 
Total Number of 
Signatures 
-.15 1.14 -.01 -.13 .90 
Number of Data 
Links 
.24 .53 .03 .45 .65 
Joint Status -2.74 3.66 -.06 -.75 .45 
Both Data and 
Funding Links 




-1.11 3.00 -.03 -.37 .71 
None of the interdependency variables proved instrumental in predicting 
estimation or engineering cost variance (Tables 8 and 9). 
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Table 9. Dependent Variable: Engineering Cost Variance 








(Constant) 9.81 16.95 .58 .56 
Development 
Estimate 
.00 .00 -.03 -.41 .68 
RDT&E Stage -11.54 11.45 -.07 -1.01 .31 
PM Turnover 1.62 26.20 .00 .06 .95 
Dummy 2005 -4.33 16.59 -.02 -.26 .79 
Dummy 2006 16.95 17.79 .09 .95 .34 
Dummy 2007 -2.22 16.30 -.01 -.14 .89 
Number of 
Program Elements 
.06 2.87 .00 .02 .98 
Total Number of 
Signatures 
2.95 5.38 .04 .55 .58 
Number of Data 
Links 
2.12 2.51 .06 .85 .40 
Joint Status -8.87 17.26 -.04 -.51 .61 
Both Data and 
Funding Links 




-10.86 14.14 -.06 -.77 .44 
Whereas some of these relationships are important, the R squares remained 
fairly low, indicating that important predictors of program performance may have been 
missing from the models. However, several of the variables were significant at a low 
enough level to suggest that perhaps their significance would continue in the presence 
of other predictors. 
The next set of tasks was to isolate the extent to which acquisition performance 
breaches (i.e., per unit cost growth, schedule delays, and feature shortfalls) in an 
upstream program cascaded to downstream interdependent MDAP programs. A series 
of t-tests were used to test the relationships. 
Recall that the data collection effort was able to isolate the specific neighboring 
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programs for each MDAP.  To obtain the cascades, the upstream MDAP was lagged by 
one year.  This provided the ability to examine how last year’s upstream program 
performance influenced the current year downstream program.  Only the data and 
funding variables were tested because these were the only two variables that provided 
linkage information.  The first test involved examination of the entire dataset for each 
year (note that CY 2004 is not included because those data become the lag for CY 
2005). Where the data allowed, problem MDAP performers (PAUC growth greater than 
13 indicating a Nunn-McCurdy Breach) were also tested to see if they might yield 
greater cascades on their downstream partners.  Table 10 provides the results of the t-
tests for each of the years.  Given the amount of data, only those relationships that 
demonstrated a significant and positive relationship are discussed below.  A significant, 
positive relationship illustrates that as the upstream experiences problems, so goes the 
downstream program. 
Table 11 illustrates the t-tests for those programs that share a funding 
interdependency.  Note that the only positive relationship was in 2007 and related to 
annual RDT&E PAUC growth.  In terms of the data interdependencies (see Table 11), 
positive relationships were observed on schedule cost variance (CY 2005), engineering 
cost variance (CY 2005 and CY 2007), estimating cost variance (CY 2005, CY 2006, 
and CY 2007), and annual RDT&E PAUC growth (CY 2007). 
For those programs that share both data and funding interdependencies, 
engineering cost variance (CY 2005) and estimating cost variance (CY 2006) 
demonstrated significant positive relationships. When examining those MDAPs that 
exhibited cost growth problems, the cascades appeared especially troublesome.  For 
the funding interdependencies positive cascades were identified for estimating cost 
variance, percent growth from baseline, and annual percent RDT&E PAUC growth.  The 
percent growth from baseline was especially concerning because it was positive for 
three of the four years (CY 2006, CY 2007, and CY 2008).  Moreover, annual RDT&E 
PAUC growth was positive for CY 2007 and CY 2009. 
Similar findings were demonstrated in the data interdependency group. Both the 
percent growth from baseline and annual RDT&E PAUC growth were positive for the 
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majority of the years.  For the data and funding interdependency group, percent growth 
from baseline was significant for two of the years (CY 2005 and CY 2009), but annual 
percent RDT&E PAUC growth was only significant in CY 2009 (see Table 12). 
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Table 10. Funding Interdependencies 
year Variable Mean t df Sig. (2-
tailed)  




Schedule Cost Variane 
2005 
Lagged Percent Schedule 
Variance 2.38 
1.47 34 .15 
 
      
Nearest Neighbor Percent 
Schedule Variance .00        
2006 
Lagged Percent Schedule 
Variance .00 
-2.33 61 .02 
 
      
Nearest Neighbor Percent 
Schedule Variance .31 
 
      
2007 
Lagged Percent Schedule 
Variance .18 
-.52 117 .60 
 
      
Nearest Neighbor Percent 
Schedule Variance .28 
 
      
2009 
Lagged Percent Schedule 
Variance .76 
.46 120 .64 
 
      
Nearest Neighbor Percent 
Schedule Variance .62 
 
      
Engineering Cost Variance 
2005 
Lagged Percent Engineering 
Variance 3.24 
1.40 34 .17 
       
Nearest Neighbor Percent 
Engineering Variance -.39        
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2006 
Lagged Percent Engineering 
Variance .39 
.47 61 .64 
       
Nearest Neighbor Percent 
Engineering Variance .13        
2007 
Lagged Percent Engineering 
Variance .63 
1.44 117 .15 
       
Nearest Neighbor Percent 
Engineering Variance .23        
2009 
Lagged Percent Engineering 
Variance .05 
-3.97 120 .00 
       
Nearest Neighbor Percent 
Engineering Variance .59        
Estimating Cost Variance 
2005 
Lagged Percent Estimating 
Variance 6.54 
.79 31 .44 
 
>13 
Lagged Percent Estimating 
Variance 28.01 
5.29 7 .001 
Nearest Neighbor Percent 
Estimating Variance 3.34 
 Nearest Neighbor Percent 
Estimating Variance -1.66 
2006 
Lagged Percent Estimating 
Variance 1.19 




    
Nearest Neighbor Percent 




    
2007 
Lagged Percent Estimating 
Variance -.03 




    
Nearest Neighbor Percent 




    
Percent Growth From Baseline 
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2005 
Lagged Percent Growth 
From Baseline 29.31 
-.36 36 .72 
 
>13 
Lagged Percent Growth 
From Baseline 62.71 
.85 17 .41 
Nearest Neighbor Percent 
Growth from Baseline 32.15  
Nearest Neighbor Percent 
Growth from Baseline 50.64 
2006 
Lagged Percent Growth 
From Baseline 26.35 
.84 63 .41 
 
>13 
Lagged Percent Growth 
From Baseline 66.66 
2.99 28 .01 
Nearest Neighbor Percent 
Growth from Baseline 20.43  
Nearest Neighbor Percent 
Growth from Baseline 33.43 
2007 
Lagged Percent Growth 
From Baseline 20.43 
.47 118 .64 
 
>13 
Lagged Percent Growth 
From Baseline 72.58 
3.40 42 .00 
Nearest Neighbor Percent 
Growth from Baseline 17.67  
Nearest Neighbor Percent 
Growth from Baseline 32.63 
2009 
Lagged Percent Growth 
From Baseline 13.33 
-2.19 241 .03 
 
>13 
Lagged Percent Growth 
From Baseline 70.85 
3.69 42 .00 
Nearest Neighbor Percent 
Growth from Baseline 22.35 
 Nearest Neighbor Percent 
Growth from Baseline 34.15 
Annual RDT&E PAUC Growth 
2006 
Lagged PAUC Percent 
Growth 40.79 
.01 57 .99 
 
>13 
Lagged PAUC Percent 
Growth 227.07
.99 9 .35 
Nearest Neighbor PAUC 
Percent Growth 40.46  
Nearest Neighbor PAUC 
Percent Growth 115.61
2007 
Lagged PAUC Percent 
Growth 196.97
2.74 111 .01 
 
>13 
Lagged PAUC Percent 
Growth 839.11
3.07 25 .01 
Nearest Neighbor PAUC 
Percent Growth 4.47  
Nearest Neighbor PAUC 
Percent Growth 8.59 
2009 
Lagged PAUC Percent 
Growth 8.46 
1.80 127 .07 
 
>13 
Lagged PAUC Percent 
Growth 48.82 
4.71 16 .00 
Nearest Neighbor PAUC 
Percent Growth 4.21 
 Nearest Neighbor PAUC 
Percent Growth 8.72 
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Table 11. Data Interdependencies 
Year Variable Mean t df Sig. (2-
tailed)   




Schedule Cost Variance 
2005 
Lagged Percent Schedule 
Variance 3.77 
5.26 287 .00 
 
>13 
Lagged Percent Schedule 
Variance 37.78 
24.39 26 .00 
Finley Percent Schedule 
Variance .27  
Finley Percent Schedule 
Variance .15 
2006 
Lagged Percent Schedule 
Variance .25 
-.28 306 .78 
  
  
    
Finley Percent Schedule 
Variance .29   
  
    
2007 
Lagged Percent Schedule 
Variance .27 
.17 320 .87 
  
  
    
Finley Percent Schedule 
Variance .26   
  
    
2009 
Lagged Percent Schedule 
Variance .36 
.33 214 .74 
  
  
    
Finley Percent Schedule 
Variance .30   
  
    
Engineering Cost Variance 
2005 
Lagged Percent Engineering 
Variance 2.16 
5.95 287 .00  >13 
Lagged Percent 
Engineering Variance 13.21 
.08 1131 .94 
Finley Percent Engineering 
Variance -.45  
Finley Percent Engineering 
Variance 12.77 
2006 Lagged Percent Engineering 
Variance -.42 -3.31 307 .00  
>13 Lagged Percent 
Engineering Variance 13.21 .08 1131 .94 
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Finley Percent Engineering 
Variance 46.84  
Finley Percent Engineering 
Variance 12.77 
2007 
Lagged Percent Engineering 
Variance 45.04 
3.27 320 .00  >13 
Lagged Percent 
Engineering Variance 13.21 
.08 1131 .94 
Finley Percent Engineering 
Variance .14  
Finley Percent Engineering 
Variance 12.77 
2009 
Lagged Percent Engineering 
Variance .00 
-3.58 214 .00  >13 
Lagged Percent 
Engineering Variance 13.21 
.08 1131 .94 
Finley Percent Engineering 
Variance .54  
Finley Percent Engineering 
Variance 12.77 
Estimating Cost Variance 
2005 
Lagged Percent Estimating 
Variance 10.13 
1.94 287 .05 
 
>13 
Lagged Percent Estimating 
Variance 89.30 
5.24 34 .00 
Finley Percent Estimating 
Variance 4.15  
Finley Percent Estimating 
Variance -4.16 
2006 
Lagged Percent Estimating 
Variance 3.88 
2.00 306 .05 
 
>13 
Lagged Percent Estimating 
Variance 40.20 
31.44 38 .00 
Finley Percent Estimating 
Variance 1.82  
Finley Percent Estimating 
Variance -1.68 
2007 
Lagged Percent Estimating 
Variance 1.82 
5.02 319 .00 
 
>13 
Lagged Percent Estimating 
Variance 32.19 
7.75 13 .00 
Finley Percent Estimating 
Variance -3.64  
Finley Percent Estimating 
Variance -48.16
Percent Growth From Baseline 
2005 
Lagged Percent Growth 
From Baseline 30.43 
.68 225 .50  >13 
Lagged Percent Growth 
From Baseline 72.56 
5.82 100 .00 
Finley Percent Growth From 
Baseline 27.06  
Finley Percent Growth 
From Baseline 29.09 
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2006 
Lagged Percent Growth 
From Baseline 30.10 
-.03 253 .98  >13 
Lagged Percent Growth 
From Baseline 73.81 
5.72 108 .00 
Finley Percent Growth From 
Baseline 30.22  
Finley Percent Growth 
From Baseline 31.18 
2007 
Lagged Percent Growth 
From Baseline 30.20 
-.34 264 .73  >13 
Lagged Percent Growth 
From Baseline 78.87 
6.50 112 .00 
Finley Percent Growth From 
Baseline 31.96  
Finley Percent Growth 
From Baseline 28.87 
2009 
Lagged Percent Growth 
From Baseline 29.94 
-.18 276 .85  >13 
Lagged Percent Growth 
From Baseline 85.71 
6.28 97 .00 
Finley Percent Growth From 
Baseline 30.85  
Finley Percent Growth 
From Baseline 29.00 
Annual RDT&E PAUC Growth 
2006 
Lagged PAUC Percent 
Growth 126.72
-1.22 187 .22 
 
>13 
Lagged PAUC Percent 
Growth 412.36
2.67 56 .01 
Finley PAUC Percent 
Growth 196.28  
Finley PAUC Percent 
Growth 138.02
2007 
Lagged PAUC Percent 
Growth 113.79
3.36 205 .00 
 
>13 
Lagged PAUC Percent 
Growth 418.92
3.83 54 .00 
Finley PAUC Percent 
Growth 9.02  
Finley PAUC Percent 
Growth 9.25 
2009 
Lagged PAUC Percent 
Growth 14.77 
1.68 185 .09 
 
>13 
Lagged PAUC Percent 
Growth 48.57 
4.38 56 .00 
Finley PAUC Percent 
Growth 7.76  
Finley PAUC Percent 
Growth 8.10 
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Table 12. Both Funding and Data Interdependencies 
Year Variable Mean t df Sig. (2-
tailed)   




Schedule Cost Variance 
2005 
Lagged Percent Schedule 
Variance 7.4 
1.5 10 .2 
       
Coupled Percent Schedule 
Variance .0        
2006 
Lagged Percent Schedule 
Variance .0 
-1.0 11 .3 
       
Coupled Percent Schedule 
Variance .4        
2007 
Lagged Percent Schedule 
Variance .3 
.9 25 .4 
       
Coupled Percent Schedule 
Variance .1        
2009 
Lagged Percent Schedule 
Variance .1 
-.8 17 .4 
       
Coupled Percent Schedule 
Variance .6        
Engineering Cost Variance 
2005 
Lagged Percent Engineering 
Variance 7.3 




Engineering Variance 2.4 
1.3 66 .2 
Coupled Percent 
Engineering Variance -1.0  
Coupled Percent 
Engineering Variance 1.0 
2006 Lagged Percent Engineering 
Variance -.3 -2.3 11 .0  
>13 Lagged Percent 
Engineering Variance 2.4 1.3 66 .2 
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Coupled Percent 
Engineering Variance 5.4  
Coupled Percent 
Engineering Variance 1.0 
2007 
Lagged Percent Engineering 
Variance 3.1 




Engineering Variance 2.4 
1.3 66 .2 
Coupled Percent 
Engineering Variance .3  
Coupled Percent 
Engineering Variance 1.0 
2009 
Lagged Percent Engineering 
Variance .1 




Engineering Variance 2.4 
1.3 66 .2 
Coupled Percent 
Engineering Variance .2  
Coupled Percent 
Engineering Variance 1.0 
Estimating Cost Variance 
2005 
Lagged Percent Estimating 
Variance 2.6 




    
Coupled Percent Estimating 
Variance 22.3   
  
    
2006 
Lagged Percent Estimating 
Variance 20.7 
3.3 11 .0 
 
>13 
Lagged Percent Estimating 
Variance 42.1 
20.1 5 .0 
Coupled Percent Estimating 
Variance -.4  
Coupled Percent 
Estimating Variance .1 
2007 
Lagged Percent Estimating 
Variance .1 




    
Coupled Percent Estimating 
Variance -1.7   
  
    
Percent Growth From Baseline 
2005 Lagged Percent Growth 
From Baseline 9.2 1.4 12 .2  >13 
Lagged Percent Growth 
From Baseline 52.4 44.2 2 .0 
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Coupled Percent Growth 
From Baseline -3.4  
Coupled Percent Growth 
From Baseline .9 
2006 
Lagged Percent Growth 
From Baseline -3.1 




    
Coupled Percent Growth 
From Baseline -8.3   
  
    
2007 
Lagged Percent Growth 
From Baseline -1.2 
-.6 25 .6 
 
>13 
Lagged Percent Growth 
From Baseline 14.7 
2.5 4 .1 
Coupled Percent Growth 
From Baseline 3.2  
Coupled Percent Growth 
From Baseline 3.5 
2009 
Lagged Percent Growth 
From Baseline 9.6 
.1 40 .9 
 
>13 
Lagged Percent Growth 
From Baseline 55.4 
3.5 6 .0 
Coupled Percent Growth 
From Baseline 8.5  
Coupled Percent Growth 
From Baseline -3.4 
Annual RDT&E PAUC Growth 
2006 
Lagged PAUC Percent 
Growth 671.2 
1.0 5 .4 
 
>13 
Lagged PAUC Percent 
Growth 2009.8
1.1 1 .5 
Coupled PAUC Percent 
Growth 152.9  
Coupled PAUC Percent 
Growth 364.8 
2007 
Lagged PAUC Percent 
Growth 54.5 
1.3 17 .2 
 
>13 
Lagged PAUC Percent 
Growth 306.9 
1.4 2 .3 
Coupled PAUC Percent 
Growth 1.0  
Coupled PAUC Percent 
Growth 4.3 
2009 
Lagged PAUC Percent 
Growth 6.9 
1.3 18 .2  >13 
Lagged PAUC Percent 
Growth
25.9 
4.9 4 .0 
Coupled PAUC Percent 
Growth -1.0 
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Conclusion 
The move to joint capabilities has proven to be an important paradigm shift in 
defense.  The reasons for the shift are grounded in the need to allow the agility that 
shared resources provide.  The ability to immediately tap into partner capabilities to 
improve response time is an important consideration for future defense needs.  This 
research sought to identify whether the need for joint capabilities influenced acquisition 
success.   The ingoing assumption was that joint capabilities would require joint 
acquisition solutions and hence would influence the MDAP acquisition risk.  This study 
examined five years worth of data and looked at a number of interdependencies for their 
influence on acquisition success.  Two specific objectives were pursued: (1) to test the 
influence of funding and data interdependencies on acquisition performance, and (2) to 
test the interdependent programs for the presence of cascading effects. The results 
proved particularly pivotal. 
First, over the relatively short time span, the MDAPs have experienced 
tremendous growth in funding interdependencies.  Likewise, the percent of programs 
that share both funding and data links is on the rise. This finding speaks directly to the 
increasing complexity that MDAPs are encountering.  The findings illustrate the 
influence that joint capabilities is having on the acquisition effort. 
Second, the fact that the funding and data networks illustrated a scale free 
characteristic may prove to offer significant managerial implications.  However, 
additional research is needed to fully understand the dynamic of the scale free nature. 
Third, when examining the influence of interdependencies on individual program 
performance (the multiple regressions) the relationships appeared weak and not 
particularly useful. 
Finally, significant cascades were noted especially for the problem performers.  
The cascades illustrated that the acquisition performance of downstream programs 
were often tied to their upstream counterparts.   
The extent of the influence suggests further examination of the influence of 
interdependencies on acquisition success is clearly warranted. According to these 
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results, the field of acquisition may benefit greatly from future research on: 
1. the scale free nature of the relationships, 
2. metrics to more precisely identify and test interdependencies, 
3. greater examination on the program ramifications of the increasing 
complexity,  
4. improved understandings of the cascading effects of the 
interdependencies, and 
5. better insights on managerial strategies that are capable of mitigating 
the risk of the interdependencies. 
With additional research, the study of interdependencies may offer promise for 
improving early assessment of program development resources, establishing more 
realistic program thresholds, and highlighting areas of risk that may have escaped 
management attention. 
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